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Introduction: Hegemony and Dissent?
1 We must both mould the movement according to the people and mobilise the people
behind the movement. If the gap between these two widens too far the people will be
alienated from the movement.1
2 The  Dravida  Kazhagam  and  Dravidian  parties  have  fooled  people  for  50  years  into
thinking that the Brahmins are responsible for the caste system … By pin-pointing this
one enemy they have been able to cast all blame onto the Brahmins for their own gain).2
3 Across India and since the 1970s, movements amongst the lowest castes have begun to
call themselves Dalits (literally, ‘the oppressed’) in a spirit of pride and militancy, and as a
rejection of caste norms and values.3 Independent Dalit organisations mobilise for social
justice and have won significant victories in social life and electoral competition. The
ascension of R. K. Narayan to the Presidency of India, the election of Mayawati to the
Chief  Ministership  of  Uttar  Pradesh,  and  the  steady  increase  in  the  number  of
autonomous (that is not members of a mainstream party) Dalit Members of Parliament, of
Legislative  Assemblies  and  Panchayats,  all  suggest  the  erosion  of  the  material  and
psychological  structures  that  have  underpinned  institutionalised  caste  patronage  in
Indian politics. Given the history of non-Brahmin and Dravidian mobilisation in Tamil
Nadu one would expect this process to be particularly entrenched here.
4 Certainly, the Liberation Panther Party (VCK, Viduthalai Ciruthaigal Katchi)—the largest
Dalit movement in Tamil Nadu, South India—which is part of this wave of Dalit politics,
has now gained recognition as a political player. Indeed in 1999, when they abandoned
their decade-long poll boycott and entered electoral competition as part of a third-front,
Dalit movements promised to breathe fresh air into the stultified world of Tamil politics.
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They were perceived as radical actors with the capacity to shake up political institutions
and re-connect them to the masses (Gorringe 2005). In the decade since then, however,
that initial optimism has gradually evaporated. Speaking in 2008, Muthukumar —a social
activist and commentator—insisted that ‘they are finished’ and foresaw the demise of the
Panthers within five years.4 T. Edwin, a Christian Dalit, was similarly disappointed, noting
that ‘they change track with each political wind’.5
5 Significantly, these comments do not reflect a massive downturn in the party’s electoral
fortunes. Indeed, the VCK is now an established political player and its leader was elected
to the Lok Sabha (Indian Parliament) as an MP in 2009. Rather, the sense of anti-climax is
born of the VCK’s all too perfect integration into the political system. The Panthers have
arguably become so ‘domesticated’ that they resemble the very institutions they set out
to reform. Whilst there is disagreement about the extent of this and arguments about
how much the Panthers can achieve within the mainstream, there are echoes here of a
broader discussion on the outcomes of socio-political mobilisation.
6 In his classic book, The Strategy of Social Protest, Gamson (1990: 28-9) argues that social
movements aim at two basic outcomes: acceptance as political players and the securing of
new advantages for participants.  On the basis of  this assertion,  he devises a fourfold
categorization of movement outcomes:  groups gaining full  acceptance and many new
advantages are seen as successful and are said to have attained a ‘full response’; those
that  are  fully  accepted but  secure  no advantages  are subject  to  ‘co-optation’;  where
movements gain many advantages but no recognition they are described as being ‘pre-
empted’;  and  finally,  those  that  gain  neither  acceptance  nor  advantages,  ‘collapse’.
Although he is  one of  the foremost  theorists  of  social  movements,  Gamson operates
within a broader political process approach that privileges the workings of institutional
politics  and  neglects  socio-cultural  discrimination.  We  can,  though,  take  Gamson’s
measures of success as a useful (albeit imperfect) springboard for analysis since, whilst
Tamil Dalit activists clearly reject the social hierarchies of caste through which daily life
is mediated, the focus here is on the integration of Dalit parties into political institutions. 
7 The starting point for these deliberations is the disparity between the VCK’s successful
pursuit of the politics of recognition and the pessimism of activists above. Pandian (1992)
notes how the two dominant parties in Tamil politics have secured the active consent of
subaltern classes despite neglecting their interests. At the least, the Dravidian parties
have  managed  to  secure  Dalit  votes  until  recently.  The  admixture  of  cinematic  and
material populism used to this end means that many of my Dalit respondents still spoke
of M.G. Ramachandran (MGR), a famous star of the Tamil screen who founded one of the
main Tamil parties and became Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, as a heroic figure in the late
1990s. Karanth (2004: 162) argues that we need ‘to identify the different forms of dissent
and their limitations, for the ex-Untouchable castes in India today are seeking a form of
patronage  that  does  not  reduce  them to  cultural  dependence’.  As  Dalit  parties  have
moved from campaigns against social injustice and begun to demand a ‘share of political
power’  (a VCK slogan in 1999),  they are seeking a form of recognition that does not
reduce them to political redundancy. 
8 The Viduthalai  Ciruthaigal  Katchi has successfully transformed from the largest Dalit
movement in Tamil Nadu into a recognised political organisation. Despite the obvious
political achievements of the party, activists and commentators express disappointment
or disillusionment with its performance. The Panthers clearly reject the caste hierarchy,
but they increasingly replicate hegemonic forms of politics which can undermine their
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aims. In exploring Dalit challenges to, and compromises with Dravidian hegemony, this
paper contends that the frustrations expressed by activists and commentators largely
stem  from  the  disjunction  between  rhetoric  and  reality  in  Dalit  politics.  Whilst
movements  promise  to  eradicate  caste  and  renew political  institutions,  Dalit  parties
become not only reconciled or resigned to democratic participation (Gundimeda 2009),
but actively recreate the forms, structures and styles of politics from which they were
previously excluded.6 This paper explores how Dalit parties situate themselves in relation
to the hegemonic politics of the state. 
9 We begin by considering the particularities of Tamil politics and examine the integration
of Dalit parties and the impact that this integration has had. In so doing, we draw on
Gamson’s work on political recognition to chart the extent to which Dalit parties can be
said to be successful in the state. Having outlined the contours of Dravidian politics, we
trace the political trajectory of the VCK, charting its resistance to and compliance with
Dravidian hegemony and argue that the path-dependent behaviour of the party partly
explains  this  disjuncture  between activist  and political  perceptions.  We see  how the
dominant political parties have set the template for what it means to ‘do’ institutional
politics in Tamil Nadu which serves as both an opportunity and a constraint for potential
challengers. This template has determined the institutionalisation of agitational politics,
both at the level of political practice and ideology. The paper, thus, shows how the VCK
has been able to mobilise around Tamil nationalism whilst its anti-caste activities have
been sidelined. This analysis of the political structures within which the VCK operates
problematises Gamson’s simplistic view of success and failure, by noting how even a ‘full
response’ (acceptance and gains) may be seen as a form of co-optation by activists if it
means that the party is constrained to operate within established parameters. 
 
Dravidian Politics in Tamil Nadu
10 Understanding the complex and often contradictory articulations and practices of Tamil
Dalit parties requires an appreciation of the politics of the state. Political participation
and institutions in Tamil Nadu have been defined by ‘a history of agitational politics’
(Viswanathan 2004). The principal political parties in the state all emerged directly or
indirectly from the non-Brahmin movement in the early 20th century, particularly the
organisations and mobilisational forms launched by E. V. Ramasami Naicker (popularly
known as ‘Periyar’, ‘the great one’).7 The most enduring of these organisations are the
Dravida  Kazhagam  (DK,  ‘Dravidian  Federation’)  and  its  two  off-shoots,  the  Dravida
Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK, ‘Dravidian Progressive Federation’) and All India Anna DMK
(AIADMK).8 A detailed analysis of the non-Brahmin movement is beyond the scope of this
paper, but it is clear that the progressive ideology and policies of Dravidian mobilisation
rested on a middle-caste constituency that served to curtail and shape the politics of
these parties in office (Subramanian 1999, Harriss 2002). 
11 Tamil  political  institutions have been dominated by Dravidian parties  since the 1967
election,  but  their  influence  was  felt  long  before  they  assumed  office.  Successful
mobilisation  during  the  1930s  and  1940s  placed  caste  categories  and  linguistic
nationalism at the centre of Tamil politics meaning that Independence was portrayed as
the  replacement  of  one  elite  (British)  by  another  (upper-caste,  Hindi  speaking
Northerners).  The DK was never a serious political contender and the Congress Party
dominated institutional politics after Independence but saw their vote-share eroded at
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each election by the DMK. The DMK was a regional nationalist party which played on
language  nationalism  (rather  than  insisting  upon  it)  and  espoused  populist/socialist
policies that were successfully mediated to the electorate through the means of cinema
and an effective party organisation. In 1967, Tamil Nadu was the first Indian state to elect
such a party to government.
12 Under its founder, Annadurai, and his successor, Karunanidhi, the DMK governed until
1976.  Its  political  pragmatism,  however,  saw  the  party  increasingly  relinquish  its
radicalism  both  in  terms  of  anti-Hindi  agitation  and  economic  policies.  In  1972  in
response to DMK ‘corruption’, MGR formed the AIADMK which wrested power from the
DMK in 1977 due to MGR’s popularity and populism (as typified by the free school meal
for children).  Since then, the two parties have alternated in power.  Recent elections,
however, suggest that the Dravidian parties are facing tougher challenges and struggling
to gain clear majorities (Harriss 2002, Subramanian 2002, Wyatt 2002, Pandian 2006). The
oscillation between the parties continues into the present, but the conflict between the
two has never really been based on ideological or policy differences and both parties have
toned down their linguistic nationalism and reigned in their social reform agendas. It is
telling that MGR split away from the DMK over allegations of corruption rather than
because  he  had  a  different  vision.  Both  parties  continue  to  offer  similar,  populist
manifestos  and elections  continue to  be  fought  on questions  of  corruption,  abuse of
power and dynastic succession. 
13 The rise of coalition politics has been hailed in this context as potentially infusing new
life and ideas into Tamil politics (Wyatt 2002). It clearly offers opportunities for emerging
political actors (Gundimeda 2009), but it is important to bear two things in mind. Firstly,
despite challenges to Dravidian politics, Dravidianism plays a hegemonic role in Tamil
society and shapes the politico-cultural sensibilities of Tamils (Subramanian 2005: 3821).
The  Dravidian historical  cultural  narrative  hinges  on regionalism and ‘pure  Tamil’  (
centamil), and is buttressed by the veneration of political leaders and film stars (George
2002, Bate 2009). As Bate (2009: 37) argues, Dravidian hegemony has ‘served to protect the
position of (non-Brahmin) privileged castes and classes’. Secondly, and most important
for this paper, Dravidian rule has shaped what it means to ‘do politics’ in the state and
this legacy may endure beyond any electoral reversals. In other words, irrespective of the
policies  and  electoral  performance  of  Dravidian  parties,  they  established  a  political
template that has both framed and influenced subsequent mobilisation. It is to an analysis
of this template that we now turn.
 
How to ‘do’ Tamil Politics
14 Political organisations do not emerge or operate in a vacuum and comprehending the
forms of contemporary Dalit institutions must, therefore, examine the existing ‘rules of
the game’. Dravidian parties, I contend, have significantly shaped the political culture of
the state and influence the modes of mobilisation, political styles and approaches to caste
and social radicalism that emerging parties adopt. In Tilly’s (1986) terms, this ‘repertoire
of contention’ serves both as an opportunity—in that it  offers new entrants to Tamil
politics a model  and legitimising narrative to draw on—and as a constraint— in that
deviations from the norm invite repression.
15 Subramanian (2002: 126) argues that Dravidian parties ‘increased political participation,
aided  the  representation  of  the  emergent  strata,  enriched  civic  life,  and  thus
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strengthened  pluralist  democracy’.  Social  pluralism,  he  explains,  refers  to  the
proliferation of autonomous associational forms that are tied neither to the state nor to
each other. This being the case, we would expect emerging groups to have little difficulty
in organising or expressing themselves, and the burgeoning of political parties in the
state over the past few decades would appear to confirm his argument. The primary path
to  political  contestation  in  Tamil  Nadu,  however,  is  through  mass  mobilisation  and
agitation prior to political recognition (Harriss 2002, Gorringe 2005).
16 Successive  parties  that  emerged  from  the  AIADMK,  the  Vanniyar  dominated  Paatali
Makkal Katchi (‘Toiler’s Party’),  the Dalit Puthiya Tamizhagam (‘New Tamilnadu’) and
VCK,  however,  have  all  resorted  to  (often  extra-legal)  protests  to  gain  political
recognition. Road and rail blockades, hunger fasts, the stoning of government buses and
other forms of violence have become essential components of the Tamil activists’ tool-kit.
Dalit  activists,  thus,  insisted  that  ‘without  protest  we  cannot  achieve  anything.  One
cannot claim anything from the government without protest. Only if we protest is there
an opportunity for our community to do anything’.9
17 It is not just the modes of mobilisation which reflect dominant norms. Emergent parties
have tended to replicate the political styles of their predecessors too. Subramanian (1999)
has rightly characterised Dravidian parties as populist political organisations that revolve
around a central leader or ‘big man’ (Mines 1994) in whom power is centralised. Such
leadership,  as  Price  (1989)  noted,  derives  from  kingly  models  and  establishes  a
hierarchical  relationship between a  leader  and their  followers.  Bate  (2009),  however,
demonstrates that the monarchical style of Dravidian politics was as much invented as
inherited.  The  ties  between Tamil  cinema and politics  are  no  coincidence  here,  and
Pandian (1992) shows how politicians have used their screen image to attract voters and
emphasise  the  importance  of  honour  (mânam)  in  Tamil  life,  reinforcing  and
reinterpreting cultural values in the process.
18 Subramanian (1999, 2002) contends that the emphasis on a central leader is mitigated by
significant ‘cadre autonomy’ and he observes how schisms result in the formation of new
parties to support this claim. Splits, however, tend to occur when there is a disgruntled
rival for the throne rather than a popular uprising. The most successful such schism
culminated in the formation of the AIADMK by MGR. Subsequent attempts to emulate this
model, notably by V. Gopalsamy (‘Vaiko’), have failed to create viable alternatives to the
two main political parties. Chandhoke (1999), furthermore, points to deep-rooted power
asymmetries  which  lead  to  cadre  prostrating  themselves  before  their  leaders.  Dalit
activists  rarely  went  to  such  extremes  but  their  behaviour  and  political  structures
indicated that they shared the perception of leaders as heroes or semi-deities (Bate 2009,
Wyatt 2010). Leaders were deferred to, asked to name children and bless marriages and
their speeches and likenesses were treasured. When Thirumavalavan (the VCK leader)
was ill, much of the social and political life of the VCK party came to a standstill (Gorringe
2005). This partly reflected the esteem in which he was held, partly indicated the lack of
an established secondary leadership, but partly mirrored a wider socio-political structure
in which leaders are venerated (George 2002: 518). Opponents, potential followers, the
media  and  existing  cadre  create  certain  expectations  and  rituals  of  leadership.  The
celebration  of  lyrical  Tamil  rhetoric  and  the  need  to  reach  out  to  a  semi-literate
constituency in the case of Dalit leaders combine to mould the institution of leadership.
De Wit’s (1996: 65) detailed study of political intermediaries in Tamil Nadu, thus, points
towards a ‘politics of mass idolatry’ which renders people dependent on the state or, at
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least, on brokers who mediate between them and the state. The pre-eminent position of
party leaders was bolstered by structures that placed them at the centre, but was further
reinforced by caste considerations (Gorringe 2010). 
19 At first sight, it is a paradox ‘that such a large number of caste parties should sprout in
Tamil  Nadu,  the  cradle  of  the  Dravidian  movement’  (Subramanian  2001:  46).  It is
paradoxical because Periyar is hailed as an inspiration by all Tamil leaders. The Dravidian
movement  was,  rhetorically  at  least,  committed  to  the  struggle  against  caste
discrimination and sought to foster a Tamil identity that subsumed other social fault-
lines. There is a smug complacency in the utterances of Tamil politicians each time the
issue of reservations flares up, and they are proud of Tamil Nadu’s history of positive
discrimination to tackle inequalities.10
20 In what sense, then, is the tendency for caste-based parties a legacy of Dravidianism?
Harriss (2002) maintains that the growth of  caste-based parties reflects a betrayal  of
Dravidian discourse, whilst Subramanian (2002) views their emergence as reflecting the
gradual decline of the Dravidian parties. Prior to this, he argues, ‘Congress, the DMK and
the AIADMK absorbed most caste groups into their social coalitions’ (Subramanian 2002:
133). Whilst this is undoubtedly the case and both positions have some justification (and
are not necessarily incompatible), they avoid the question of why caste remains such a
salient form of identity despite nearly a century of non-Brahmin mobilisation. 
21 The ‘frustrations of the ambitions of individual politicians’ (Harriss 2002: 109) certainly
play a part, and social movement research points to mobilisation as a vehicle for political
advancement (Tarrow 1998, McCarthy & Zald 1987). This still begs the question of why
caste was so readily available to leaders after the long history of Dravidian agitation and
rule. Following Barnett (1976) I argue that one reason for this is that caste was placed at
the centre of Dravidian deliberations and practice. Though Periyar supposedly ‘fought
both  the  caste  system  and  Brahmin  hegemony’  (Subramanian  2001:  46),  Dravidian
organisations were built around the dominant middle-castes (Barnett 1976, Ravikumar
2006)  and  the  architecture  of  caste-based  reservations  in  Tamil  Nadu  extended  the
benefits  secured  for  SCs  to  those  categorised  as  Sudra  castes  at  an  early  stage.
Subramanian’s (1999) own work demonstrates the degree to which Dravidian parties were
dominated by BC groups and interests.
22 From the outset, thus, caste was built into Tamil politics even as it was spoken out of it
(Pandian 2008). Non-Brahmin is an apt nomenclature for a movement that displaced one
elite group with another. The lack of a coherent anti-caste programme is seen in the
failure  to  carry  through  land-reforms;  the  continued  exclusion  of  Dalits;  economic
dominance of  Brahmins;  the failure to  extend reservations to the most  marginalised
castes until forced to do so by mobilisations; and the normalisation of Hindu nationalism
(Harriss 2002, Rajadurai & Geetha 2002, Ravikumar 2006). As ‘Tada’ Periyasami’s quote at
the head of this paper emphasizes, the Dravidian parties have been adept at constructing
Brahmins as the common enemy for their own gain.11 As Barnett (1976: 318) argues, the
DMK presented itself as championing the ‘common man’ but particularly appealed to ‘the
Backward Castes’. 
23 Clearly,  Dravidian  social  radicalism  was  strictly  curtailed.  Rather  than  envisaging
inequality in class or caste terms,  the Dravidian parties employed the Brahmin/Non-
Brahmin divide to suggest a commitment to social change even as its leadership and core
constituency  was  drawn from dominant,  landowning Backward Castes  (Barnett  1976,
Subramanian 1999,  Harriss  2002,  Ravikumar 2006).  By stressing language rather than
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class, the DMK (and later the AIADMK) attempted to create an imagined community of
Tamils and avoid acting upon its politically sensitive election pledges on land-reform,
dowry and caste.  Barnett  (1976:  93)  notes  how the  DMK consciously  toned down its
radical reform agenda in the late 1950s to improve its electoral chances against Congress.
In portraying Congress as a national party divorced from the concerns of Tamil voters,
the DMK narrowed the political field to the terrain of cultural nationalism (Barnett 1976,
Wyatt 2010). Social radicalism gave way to a populism that gave the impression of social
justice  whilst  leaving underlying structures  intact  (Pandian 1992,  Harriss  2002).  It  is
precisely  because  the  core  constituency  and  political  priorities  of  the  Dravidian
movement were so exclusive—neglecting the interests of marginalised groups—that caste
has become so salient in contemporary politics.
24 This brings us neatly to a final legacy of Dravidianism: the perennial tension between
radical, populist rhetoric and a politics of pragmatism. The political culture that values
heroism,  demagogues  and  film-script  endings  places  an  emphasis  on  lyrical  speech-
making, a commitment to the poor and needy and the defence of ones’ honour and social
standing (Pandian 1992). The result is a brand of populist politics that subsumes ‘politics
in rhetoric, concrete concerns in symbolic ones’ (Rajadurai & Geetha 2002: 119). The lofty
rhetoric of the hero or firebrand founders on the rocks of structural inequality and social
inertia. 
25 Political  institutions,  Rob  Jenkins  (1999:  224)  argues,  are  ‘the  means  by  which
democracy’s  change-resistant  tendencies  are  overcome’.  When  those  institutions  are
constituted by and for particular social categories, however, they can also be the means
by which calls for change are diluted. Where the Bahujan Samaj Party (People’s Majority
Party) in Uttar Pradesh has been able to field Dalit politicians and win power in the state
(Chandra  2004),  the  bi-polar  nature  of  Tamil  politics  has  precluded  minorities  from
gaining power (Gorringe 2007). Even in Uttar Pradesh, as Jaoul (2007: 142) shows, political
power is ‘regarded as a potential trap for an authentic people’s movement’,  with the
result  that  an  array  of  ‘non-political’  organisations  have  emerged  to  advance  the
concerns of the grassroots activists.  That the Dravidian parties repeatedly secure the
votes  of  marginal  groups  could  suggest  that  they  represent  the  interests  of  diverse
groups, but marginal groups have increasingly challenged Dravidian hegemony noting its
failure to properly represent differing constituencies. An emphasis on caste, however, has
militated against the formation of a united opposition.12 
26 The lack of a viable third front testifies to the Dravidian parties’ ability to construct an
overarching sense of Tamil-ness but also reflects the inability of established institutions
such as the Congress or the Communists to come to terms with contemporary expressions
and anxieties. Neither of these organisations has either had a popular, demagogic leader
or  been  comfortable  aligning  themselves  with  caste-based  parties  partly  because  an
alliance with one of the two Dravidian parties is seen as essential to gain power. These
concerns have infused the strategies of emergent outfits too, with no recognised political
players prepared to go it alone until the Desiya Morpokku Dravida Kazhagam (DMDK,
National Progressive Dravidian Federation) in 2006. Thirumavalavan, the VCK leader who
called Karunanidhi a scoundrel and Jayalalitha [the leader of the AIADMK which was in
opposition  at  the  time]  a  rogue,  thus,  according  to  Muthukumar  now deploys  more
honorific titles for his potential allies.13 
 
Party Political Panthers: Hegemonic Tamil Politics and the Dalit Challenge
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal , Free-Standing Articles
7
From Cheris to Chennai?
27 In its passage from an outsider to a recognised party, the VCK has followed a well-trodden
path  to  political  assimilation.  During  the  poll  boycott  that  denied  the  legitimacy  of
political institutions, the party declared that ‘none of you are honest, so none shall have
our votes’ as put by Thirumavalavan.14 In keeping with this, their first foray into politics
was a part of a third front that consolidated Dalit interests in alliance with the state wing
of the Congress Party (Wyatt 2002, Gorringe 2005). That front emphasised the necessity of
articulating and building alternatives, but within months of the elections in 1999 the VCK
was  allied  to  the  AIADMK.  Since  then,  it  has  switched  sides  with  little  consistency
(sometimes refusing to be allied to the Hindu right, at others rejecting any coalition with
the PMK) (Gorringe 2007).
28 For  Roberts  (2010),  the  VCK  has  succeeded  in  stripping  Dalit  voters  away  from the
Dravidian parties  through its  electoral  engagement and espousal  of  Tamil  nationalist
rhetoric. Wyatt (2010: 132) concludes that it has ‘helped to change the dynamics of the
party system’. He also acknowledges that the nascent shift towards multipartism in Tamil
politics is bi-polar in nature, but his analysis suggests that the emergent parties have
significant scope for manoeuvre. By contrast, I contend that political ‘replication’ by the
VCK means that Dalit parties are not simply reconciled to the legitimacy of electoral
contestation but to hegemonic modes of doing politics as well. I should stress here that I
do not see this as ‘replicating caste-based relations in the political arena’ (Gundimeda
2009: 57). The argument is about political rather than social forms of engagement. Thus,
those parties that have opted not to follow the time-worn path to political representation
have  failed  to  gain  electoral  successes.  Puthiya  Tamizhagam (New  Tamil  Nadu)  was
thoroughly marginalized for a decade after 1999, due to its attempts to go it alone (Wyatt
2010), but was politically resurrected (in the words of a CPI(M) activist) in 2011 thanks to
its alliance with the AIADMK. Other minor political players like the PMK have also failed
to go it alone. Significantly, however, hegemonic politics does not simply mean allying
with one or other of the main parties; it also shapes how those parties are organized and
operate. In major respects they seem to offer a mirror-image of the parties they set out to
displace. The VCK, thus, is structured around Thirumavalavan and mainly appeals to a
Paraiyar constituency.15 The ambiguity of the VCK’s position is exemplified by the use of
the terms ‘Dalit’ or ‘Liberation Panther’ that do not refer to any individual caste group in
particular, even as orators reify their ‘Paraiyar Ambedkar’. VCK activists liked to boast
that  they  had an established secondary  leadership  and pointed  to  the  committee of
representatives  that  decided  whether  to  contest  elections  in  1999.  Thirumavalavan,
however,  remains  the  epicentre  of  the  party.  Indeed,  when  I  sought  to  capture  his
speeches on camera at a flag-raising ceremony, one of the District coordinators of the
movement enjoined me to ‘take some photos of us not just of MGR’.16 This accusation has
become  more  barbed  since  Thirumavalavan  inverted  the  usual connection  between
cinema and politics by starring in films having made his name as a politician.
29 The VCK, like its Dravidian predecessors, emphasised that it fosters cadre autonomy. ‘The
VCK was built up with one pager’, Thirumavalavan insisted, ‘I cannot be everywhere at
once’.17 The leader, however, was ever-present, even when physically absent, as an image,
an oracle whose speeches and interviews were (re)cited approvingly, and as an arbitrator
tasked with deciding between courses of action. Like other parties, therefore, the VCK
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faces problems of  succession and schism:  ‘Tada’  Periyasami,  one of  Thirumavalavan’s
trusted deputies, left to form his own movement in 2002, and one of the two MLAs elected
in 2006,  K. Selvam, cited concerns about over-centralisation in 2008 (Kolappan 2008).
There were no institutional  mechanisms for a transfer of  power or the election of  a
successor. Clearly this is an issue that affects all political parties in Tamil Nadu. Bate’s
book (2009) on Dravidian politics captures the way in which party cadres engage in forms
of public devotion towards their leaders and points towards the importance of financial
centralisation. Whilst one might expect challenging groups seeking to democratise Tamil
politics to be more democratic, this is clearly not the case. It is not that alternate models
of leadership are absent since women’s wings, women’s rights movements and the Tamil
Dalit  Liberation Movement have all  sought to prefigure a more egalitarian structure.
Rather, the prevailing political culture exerts a powerful constraining force by creating
particular expectations and institutions.
30 The expectation that the party will revolve around a ‘big man’ shapes the VCK’s political
performances.18 Flag-raising  ceremonies  (that  mark  an  organisation’s  presence  in  a
locality), for instance, could be structured as community celebrations but revolve around
the visit of the leader. Activists and well-wishers desire the attention of Thirumavalavan
and view him as a heroic figure in the struggle against caste injustices. Demonstrations
and rallies are designed to give prominence to the key figure and media outlets, police
and opposition parties all  seek access to an authoritative spokesperson. Furthermore,
whilst the electoral successes of the party might have been expected to result in the
formalization of organizational roles and responsibilities, Sridharan (2001) notes how the
cost of elections and the discretionary expenditures offered to MPs both result in the
centralization of party purse strings. I could confirm this point during my fieldwork in
2010:  walls  and  billboards  in  Chennai  and  Madurai  were  daubed  in  the  colours  and
slogans of the VCK. As one political commentator noted, however, the increase in wall
space was in inverse proportion to the number of volunteers prepared to wield a brush.19
The increase in resources had been matched by rising demand for payment. Prominence,
thus, comes at a price. As well being under increased financial pressure, the VCK was said
by respondents in 2010 to have been drawn into corruption and racketeering. The VCK, in
other words, has joined the Dravidian parties and ‘partaken of the larger process of rent-
seeking, using resources thus gained to disburse patronage’ (Economic and Political Weekly
2010: 9). 
31 The way the political system is structured, thus, tends to generate certain forms and
modalities  of  political  expression.  Similar  constraints  conspire  to  channel  Dalit
movements towards caste categories  or  Tamil  nationalism.  Chandra’s  (2004)  work on
‘ethnic head-counts’ suggests that people vote for someone from their own community to
secure the benefits of office. This rational actor model fails to resonate in Tamil Nadu
where Dalit parties rarely gain office and neglects the more impassioned aspects of caste
communities. People mobilise around caste for more than purely instrumental reasons.
They  do  so  in  response  to  the  fictive  kinship  that  caste  categories  establish;  the
community-making work undertaken by movements and parties; the repression they face
as a group and the powerful appeal of caste pride. Successive challenging groups have
used,  as  Pandian  (2000)  attests,  the  emotive  language  of  caste  pride  to  generate  a
following and to foreground the issues of discrimination and exclusion. The powerful
sentiments  aroused  by  such  strategies  are  evident  in  the  assertions  of  activists  like
Anandan Paraiyar:
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32 Many acquaintances were cut off after people discovered my caste – so why not say it
openly? Some people tell  me they don’t like my calling myself ‘Paraiyar’,  but it  is to
identify myself  … those on the floor have to rise up and realise that they are being
enslaved. Why should we live in fear of this society? Why not be open?20 
33 The quote is typical in pointing to continuing oppression as a rationale for retaining a
focus on caste. Across Tamil Nadu, Dalit and intermediate groups unite around caste to
demand recognition. VCK cadres, thus, are almost invariably Dalit and mostly hail from
the  Paraiyar  caste  category.  Whilst  there  is  a  core  of  urban,  educated,  middle  class
activists, the bulk of the movement is made up from urban estates or squatter settlements
and  rural  villages  where  people  feel  that  the  party  might  lend  them some  security
(Gorringe 2005).  This  logic  is  self-perpetuating as  an emphasis  on caste  can polarise
communities and exaggerate tensions, thus rendering mobilisation on the basis of caste
more attractive, if not imperative.
34 The alternate identity with social cache is that of Tamil nationalism. Given how the
project of Tamil nationalism has been tied-up with the interests of intermediate castes
from the outset this would seem to be a counter-productive strategy. ‘Tada’ Periyasami
thus insisted that ‘Tamilians were oppressed by Tamilians before the Brahmins came
along’.21 Acting on this belief, however, is hampered by the deep-rooted attachment to
Tamil-ness in the state and by Thirumavalavan’s commitment to the Sri Lankan Tamil
cause (which featured heavily in the party’s 2011 manifesto). Dalit movements here, thus,
have invariably oriented themselves towards nationalist discourses and the VCK seeks a
‘nation of Tamils free from caste exploitation’. As the party became more mainstream it
emphasised  its  Tamil  credentials  by  vociferously  supporting  the  cause  of  Tamil  Sri
Lankans.
 
Institutionalising the Dalit Challenge?
35 The VCK thus mirrors the hegemonic organisational structures, priorities and discourses
of the institutions from which it was excluded. Its assimilation into Tamil political culture
has occasioned frustration, depression and anger amongst some cadre who view the party
as having succumbed to ‘suitcase politics’; the contemptuous phrase implying corruption
(or suitcases full of cash). Allegations abound surrounding the VCK’s links to established
parties and, according to numerous respondents in 2010, big business, real-estate and
racketeering. Irrespective of the veracity of these claims, the conviction that they are
tainted for some activists and the perception that they are tainted more widely, confirms
the concerns voiced by a VCK activist in 1999 about coalition politics:
36 Now what happens when we give support is that they make us sacrificial lambs. For us,
there are no benefits or rewards from the process at all. When allying to the DMK or
AIADMK or Congress and joining a coalition, we have to go and vote for them. Even if we
work for them, ‘no benefit’ [in English]. We cannot do anything for our community—not
for me—for our community. Protesting as a party will  not gain what this community
needs.22
37 Subramaniam suggests that political participation is stacked against Dalits and cannot
benefit them. He goes on to argue that ‘if the calf joins the piglets then the two become
one and you cannot distinguish between them’ and concludes: ‘don’t go to any political
party,  don’t  vote  for  them,  they will  neutralise  you’.  Political  engagement  is  cast  as
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unrewarding  and  is  seen  to  emasculate  movements  and  draw  their  sting.  Radical
movements, as Dalit activist and NGO worker R. Manohar argued, get ‘sucked into state or
national politics’  and get assigned petty administrative roles and responsibilities that
result in them becoming ‘mired in the petty politics of bureaucracy’.23 So, has political
engagement domesticated the Liberation Panthers? Have they, in Gamson’s terms (1990),
been co-opted?
38 This question is posed to most social movements that enter the political mainstream (Offe
1990). Coy and Hedeen (2005: 407) similarly argue that institutionalisation may lead a
movement to become ‘bureaucratized and technique-centred, losing its adaptive vitality’.
They note that institutional assimilation can involve a dilution of movement critiques
and tactics. The strategies that mobilise activists are rarely transferable to the broader
constituencies targeted in election campaigns (Offe 1990, Della Porta & Diani 1999), and
some  compromises  are  inevitable  in  the  attempt  to  widen  appeal.  In  this  context,
replicating the discourses and strategies of opponents is appealing not least because it
projects their protest as the continuation of ‘past political movements whose struggles
have long since been vindicated as just’ (Della Porta & Diani 1999: 184).
39 What  we  see  in  the  Tamil  case,  however,  illustrates  a  further  and  more  pervasive
dimension to such processes. Whilst the above accounts focus on political institutions and
the mechanisms by which challengers are integrated and their actions routinised, the
example of the VCK emphasizes the socio-cultural relationships that animate the political
sphere. It is not just that the party’s platform has been blunted by the formalized nature
of its political participation, but that its mode of operation, style of protest and political
rationale have all been recalibrated in the process. In his book on Tamil oratory, Bate
elucidates the socio-cultural  significance of  the distinction between pure or refined (
cenmai) and vulgar (kochai) Tamil (Bate 2009: 5-6). This distinction maps onto a blueprint
for political performance in which the former is perceived and portrayed as the ‘proper’
way of doing politics. Leaders are valorised for their ability to deliver lyrical speeches in
pure  Tamil  (Bate  2009,  Gorringe  2010).  Drawing  on  Bourdieu,  Bate  notes  how  this
hierarchical schema assumes a doxic quality that naturalises particular social institutions
that are,  in fact,  the products of  certain status groups.  He further argues that  these
‘judgements  about  language  often  correspond  to  judgements  about  entire  classes  of
people’ (Bate 2009: 9). 
40 Bate  does  not  elaborate  on  this  process,  but  it  encapsulates  the  paradox  of
institutionalisation for Dalit  Parties in a Tamil  context.  In adhering to the taken-for-
granted Dravidian aesthetic and adopting the refined modes of political engagement, the
VCK unwittingly reinforces a hierarchy that casts Dalits as lesser beings. Given that most
Dalits communicate in kochai (vulgar) Tamil language and practice folk arts and games
that are perceived as being pre-modern (Ravikumar 2009), the institutionalisation of a
grassroots  Dalit  movement  can  serve  to  sever  the  links  between  leaders  and  led.
Chatterjee  (2004:  64)  argues  that  a  ‘viable  and  persuasive  politics  of  the  governed’
requires ‘a considerable act of mediation’. Whilst the VCK’s entry into politics suggested
that it could fulfil the role of mediator (Gorringe 2005), its assimilation into hegemonic
modes of doing politics has increasingly rendered the party unable to mediate. In this, its
institutionalisation echoes that of the BSP in Uttar Pradesh which, as Pai (2002) show,
came to be seen as an anti-Dalit party. Pai notes how Dalits came to rely on alternate
forms of collective mobilization for protection against caste atrocities.  Jaffrelot (2003:
294)  portrays the incremental  transfer  of  power to lower castes  in India as  a  ‘silent
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revolution’, but notes that mobilisation from below may ‘not be able to dislodge the elite
for  several  decades’.  In  the  Tamil  context,  more  than  in  UP,  the  bipolar  nature  of
elections and the forms of populism espoused by the two main parties means that the
elite are not only entrenched but are able to cast themselves as the champions of the
poor.  When Dalit  parties ally with each Dravidian party in turn in this context,  they
reinforce these claims. The upshot,  as an activist and academic,  puts it,  is that ‘Dalit
Parties are doing very well, but Dalit liberation is not. The structure remains intact’.24 In a
context  where  the  aim of  the  movement  was  to  redress  social  inequalities,  political
recognition within existing structures has served to buttress the very institutions the
VCK set out to contest.
41 Recognising this as a potential problem, Thirumavalavan took pains to insist that ‘we
must be with the people’25 and that mobilisation must ensure the continuity of the party
in his  absence.  This conviction,  however,  has not been communicated to cadres who
continue to  defer  to  the  leader  rather  than act  on their  own initiative.  The limited
autonomy of  grass-roots  campaigners  was  underscored in 2006 when dedicated local
activists were not nominated for electoral candidates and more favoured representatives
were parachuted in (The Hindu 2006). And it was tragically underscored in 2009 when two
VCK affiliated youths responded to Thirumavalavan’s hunger-fast for Sri Lankan Tamils
by  committing  or  attempting suicide  (The  Hindu 2009a,  The  Hindu 2009b).  Whilst  the
adoption of  Tamil  nationalism during  the  Sri  Lankan war  may have  been politically
astute, it begs the question of what the party stands for. As Chezhian, a long-term VCK
activist and supporter, put it: ‘Now if you ask a member of the party what their demands
are, they should be able to tell you shouldn’t they? But it is unclear whether it is Sri
Lanka, Tamil Nationalism or Dalit rights’.26
42 The gap between activists and leadership was best illustrated, though, in the activities of
the women’s wing. Though they were celebrated and called on in times of need, there was
little recognition of female leaders or demands (Gorringe 2005: chapter 6). The limited
recognition accorded to grassroots women leaders such as Pandiyammal, has also been
tempered by the patriarchal emphasis of the Tamil Protection Movement launched by the
VCK  and  PMK  (see  below).  There  were  frequent  assertions  that  organisation,
consciousness raising and mobilisation were central to the VCK as a movement, and the
1999 election campaign certainly  energised people  who had never  voted before.  The
recurrent insistence from leaders and activists was that ‘we can’t sort things out for you,
you  need  to  take  steps  first’.27 Flag-raising  ceremonies  were  preceded  by  local
organisation  and  consciousness-raising,  therefore,  and  offered  secondary  leaders  the
chance to speak. The party, however, falls into the ‘image trap’ (Pandian 1992), and could
do more to promote local figures and bridge the gap between these leaders and the grass-
roots.28 Their  efforts  are  constrained,  however,  because  institutional  structures
encourage centralised parties and also due to a popular demand for heroic leaders or
champions.  Most  of  those  interviewed  about  VCK  activism,  for  instance,  cited  their
attachment  to,  and  reverence  towards,  the  leader  who  was  cast  as  a  deliverer  or
champion (Gorringe 2005). Similarly in 2010, even those who were critical of the party
and Thirumavalavan’s focus on Sri Lanka still regarded him as their leader. 
43 The focus around a pre-eminent ‘big man’ is not accidental. Price (1999) describes durable
cultural patterns of kingship which map onto patron-client relations in the present day.
Contemporary patronage, however, derives as much from Dravidian models of politics
(Bate 2009) and party finances (Sridharan 2001) and does not necessarily tessellate with
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caste. Dalit beneficiaries, thus, may be dependent on, or indebted to, upper-caste patrons
and the emergence of  Dalit  MPs has further complicated patterns of  patronage.  It  is
telling in this context, that the most successful recent attempt to emulate the broader
appeal of the Dravidian parties has seen Vijayakanth of the DMDK consciously embrace
‘the style of politics that has been practiced in Tamil Nadu since the 1970s’ (Wyatt 2010:
167). Vijayakanth gained prominence as a screen idol, but his success, as Wyatt (2010:170)
notes, is down more to the way in which he has managed his fan-clubs and image such
that it meshes with ‘established structures of meaning’ and ways of performing politics
for the media, allies and opponents and constituents in contemporary Tamil Nadu.
44 The terrain occupied by Dalit politics, however, extends beyond the institutions of formal
politics  into  the  socio-political  structures  of  caste.  Since  the  Dravidian  parties  have
colonised  the  centre-ground  and  masked  their  caste  composition  in  (sub)nationalist
terminology,  successive  challengers  have  resorted  to  caste  as  a  means  of  mobilising
followers and gaining legitimacy. Caste constituencies are said to be easier to mobilise, in
part due to the rational self-interested ‘head-count’ politics described by Chandra (2004)
and  in  part  since  caste  politics  serve  to  animate  caste  identities  and  make  them
meaningful to people on the ground. The VCK, thus,  established itself  through caste-
based conflicts with the Vanniyar PMK and is entrenched in areas where Paraiyars are
most  populous  (Arun  2007).  Whilst  VCK  speeches  typically  reached  out  to  religious
minorities and condemned abuses against Dalits (Gorringe 2010), therefore, it remains a
predominantly  Paraiyar  party  and  has  failed  to  reach  out  and  build  on  its  political
success. The twin structures of political leadership and caste constituencies have eroded
attempts to forge pan-Dalit unity in the state. In the absence of a coherent anti-caste
Front, however, Dalit activism is curtailed.
45 Not only do existing political repertoires render Dalit parties subservient to their larger
allies, Dravidian hegemony has succeeded in focusing attention on the political aspects of
caste at the expense of the social relationships that uphold it. Campaigns for inter-caste or
self-respect marriages; a willingness to share platforms with other Dalit leaders and the
forging of links with unions and peasant groups would have been consistent with an anti-
caste agenda. Instead, the VCK joined forces with its erstwhile opponent the PMK in the
Tamil Protection Front which set itself up as defending the honour of the Tamil language
and Tamil women. Thirumavalavan (2003: 60) elsewhere argued that ‘chastity is only a
violence  fabricated  by  men—for  the  benefit  of  men—and imposed  on  women.  Tamil
society’s  code  of  life  has  been  ordered  only  central  to  that’.  The  TPM’s  vociferous
campaign against the actress Kushboo, for daring to suggest that sex before marriage
occurred in Tamil Nadu, however, obscured the centrality of chastity, arranged marriages
and monogamy to the reproduction of caste (George 2002: 502). 
46 The  TPM  was  an  attempt  to  escape  caste  confines  through  Tamil  nationalism.  The
espousal of linguistic nationalism, however, is fraught with contradictions even where it
is tempered by respect for other languages and an emphasis on caste eradication (Roberts
2010). Most Dalits speak in devalued and derided dialects and marginalised Dalit castes
speak Telegu at home. More insidiously,  the national card tends to trump all  others.
Though Thirumavalavan employs Tamil identity to signify a community of Tamilians free
from caste and untouchability, thus, his stance on the Sri Lankan conflict reveals the
perils of this position. To the question ‘What is the stand of [the VCK] in the recent
ongoing Sri Lankan peace talks?’, Thirumavalavan answered: 
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47 As Tamils, it is our duty to join together in solidarity towards this peace process. The
participation and involvement of Dalit Movements can be decided only after a significant
peace atmosphere is established here (Anbuselvam 2002: 1, emphasis added).
48 Despite  work  by  Ravikumar  (2002)  and  others  which  reveals  the  Liberation  Tiger’s
complete  neglect  of  the  Dalit  question,  the  VCK  under  Thirumavalavan  explicitly
endorses the LTTE and implicitly prioritises the national over the caste struggle as was
seen in his 2009 ‘fast-unto-death’ on the Sri Lankan issue. Whilst the plight of Tamils
caught up in the civil war demanded attention, the VCK response smacked of populism.
Paraphrasing Ambedkar’s response to Gandhi I might say; ‘it would have been justifiable,
if  Mr Thirumavalavan had resorted to this extreme step for obtaining justice for the
Dalits on which he has long insisted’. Indeed, when I suggested that Sri Lanka was an
important issue, Chezhian argued: ‘What is it to us? We are suffering and struggling daily
and need our own champion’.29
 
Liberation Panthers or Political Animals?
49 Harriss’ book (2006: 236) on institutions, politics and society in India notes that Tamil
Nadu has relatively high-rates of pro-poor expenditure, in large part due to the high rates
of political participation amongst the lower castes and classes.  He, however,  calls for
more  analysis  of  party  politics  focused  on  organisation,  ideology,  leadership  and
alliances. The significance of such research is underscored by Mosse’s contention (2007:
22) that contemporary upper class/caste dominance rests more on their ability to act as
brokers – mediating between the state and private individuals and corporations—than on
more traditional land-based forms of patronage and dependence. In Subramanian’s terms
(1999:  69),  older  patronage  networks  have  been  superseded  by  forms  of  ‘populist
clientelism’ which ‘channels patronage through the extensive social networks of party
subcultures, both to supporters and to others from the intermediate and lower strata
whose support it hopes to attract’. Subramanian (1999: 70) notes how populist clientelism
is attuned to the interests of emergent groups and effective at attracting their support. If
it blunted the intolerance of early Dravidianism, however, it also blunted the impact of
emergent  groups  and  restricted  the  emergence  of  alternative  agendas  (Subramanian
1999: 72-3).
50 Throughout this paper we have seen how the VCK operates within this political sphere
and both critiques and replicates mainstream politics. It is evident that the Liberation
Panthers operate within a sphere of power, and that some of their challenges to the
status  quo  actually  reinforce  it.  Whilst  they  offer  a  critique  of  social  norms  and
relationships, they are enmeshed within these very social forms and shaped by them.
They are constrained by the wider political culture and conceptions of power and status
(Mosse 2007). The expectations of cadre, media, opponents and potential constituents all
help to define the possibilities on offer. As Racine and Racine (1998: 10) put it ‘generally
the model for emancipation is set (even if unwillingly) by the upper castes themselves.
For many Dalits, emancipation is tantamount to an adoption of mainstream behaviour.’
Ultimately, they note, Dalits seek a dissolution of ‘dalitness’. But hegemonic politics leads
down the path of Tamil nationalism and its emphasis on chastity and morality (implicitly
based on caste norms) as well  as  attachment to heroic models of  leadership prevent
challenging groups from prefiguring more democratic organisations. Political recognition
within a clientelist state,  thus, comes at a price. Barnett (1976) notes how the DMK’s
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political project entailed the creation of new ways of doing politics that ossified social
structures and set the template for political performance in the state (Subramanian 1999,
Bate 2009). The Tamilisation of Dalit movements and parties is always more than a mere
discursive device,  since  such  packaging  has  implications  for  how  protest  politics  is
conducted, experienced and interpreted. 
51 Identities  and  politics—be  they  personal  or  institutional—are  malleable  but  are  also
forged  within  particular  socio-historical  contexts  and  discursive  forms  that  become
naturalised. This paper suggests that political parties in Tamil Nadu display significant
path-dependent behaviour. Path dependence, as Mahoney (2000: 507) explains, refers to
‘institutional  patterns  or  event  chains  that  have  deterministic  properties’.  Indeed,
political trajectories in Tamil Nadu display an ‘inherent sequentiality’ (Mahoney 2000:
509) that may be traced back to the political template established by the non-Brahmin
and Dravidian movements.  In order to comprehend Tamil  Dalit  movements,  we must
appreciate the political and institutional culture within which they are embedded. Yet, it
would  be  mistaken  to  see  them  as  determined  by  this  environment  as  some  path-
dependence  theories  would  imply.  Social  structures  such  as  caste  may  give  the
appearance of stability, but they are constantly subject to reinforcement, modification or
alteration. Social actors, as Pandian (1992: 144-5) shows, may express dissent even as they
reproduce social norms. Tamil politics, as he notes, is a ‘contested terrain’. The VCK has
been amongst the foremost challengers in recent years and has articulated a sustained
critique  of  Dravidian  rule,  caste  society  and  Hindu  nationalism.  Party  rhetoric  and
analysis  demonstrate  its  capacity  to  invert  accepted wisdom and question taken-for-
granted  ways  of  doing  things.  All  too  often,  however,  its  actions  has  belied  these
assertions and conformed to hegemonic forms. 
52 By mobilising on the basis of caste, allying with alternate Dravidian parties, organising
according to kingly models and valorising honour and caste pride,  the VCK has been
derided for selling out, becoming corrupt and betraying its ideals. On the eve of the 1999
election,  Thirumavalavan launched a  coruscating  attack  in  which  he  ‘unmasked’  the
Dravidian parties:
53 The DMK’s  alliance with the BJP has  removed the mask of  protecting Muslims.  Now
Karunanidhi stands revealed as a typical caste Hindu—not a Tamil, not a humanist, not
anti-Brahmin or Brahminism, not a defender of Islam— a typical, pucca [proper] caste
Hindu.30
54 By these measures, the VCK’s mask has also slipped. Replicating dominant values and
structures may be a pragmatic reconciliation with the political status quo—‘not a change
in  principle,  but  a  change  in  the  rigidity  of  practice’31—but  it  reinforces  power
asymmetries  and forecloses  more  radical  options.  Tilly’s  (1998:11)  work on enduring
inequalities  suggests  that  radical  groups  may be  incorporated on adverse  or  uneven
terms such that their ‘emulation and adaptation [of existing modes of action] lock …
categorical distinctions into place, making them habitual and sometimes even essential to
exploiters and exploited alike.’ Following Gundimeda’s (2009: 57) statement on Andhra
Pradesh, one thus gets the impression that the institutionalisation of Dalit movements
misses its goal if it merely ends up running ‘parallel caste-based politics’.
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Conclusion
55 ‘The VCK is finished’, Muthukumar averred at the head of this paper. He and others held
up the secession battle that will ensue once either Karunanidhi or Jayalalitha steps down
as a critical opportunity for change, but it is an indictment of Tamil Dalit politics if they
must await  developments elsewhere.  Entering political  competition has amplified the
voice of  the Panthers,  afforded them exposure in the media (both in interviews and
Ravikumar’s magazine articles), averted the accusations of extremism and expanded the
terrain of Tamil politics. Institutionalisation, however, threatens to blunt the politics of
the movement. If the public statements of the VCK are increasingly focused on Sri Lanka
and the former extremists are now seen as puppets,  then in what sense can political
recognition be regarded as a ‘success’, in Gamson’s terms, for the movement? ‘It does not
matter if it is taking time’, Thirumavalavan insisted taking the long-term view, ‘we must
bear  the  inconveniences  and afflictions  that  arise  and slowly,  slowly  strengthen the
movement’.32 In the meantime, their actions can serve to reinforce hegemonic politics:
56 ‘The Liberation Pussy-Cats!’ They used to be Panthers, but now like pussy-cats they have
gone flocking round Jayalalitha. They are selling their people. There can be exploitation
by movements against exploitation too.33 
57 If the pace of change does not quicken, the accusations of disaffected cadre and rival
leaders will increase. Path-dependent behaviour may throw up its own contingencies, of
course, and 2009 witnessed Thirumavalavan becoming the first MP to be elected from an
autonomous Dalit party in Tamilnadu. As Jaoul (2007) notes for Uttar Pradesh, however,
Dalit politics has an impact in the social as well as political spheres. Becoming a party has
enabled the VCK to invest more in cultural strategies, publications, conferences and other
forms  of  consciousness-raising,  such  as  the  documentary  and  history  films  of  Paari
Chezhian.34 
58 Enthusiastic party cadres point to a diminution of caste violence, though the more critical
ones suggest that some of this is down to the VCK remaining silent about cases that it
would have highlighted in the past.35 The billboards condemning atrocities and caste
fanatics in the late 1990s and early 2000s have given way to glossy film style posters and
murals  of  the VCK leader.  The change in emphasis  is perhaps best  captured by wall
paintings hailing Thirumavlavar (an honorific suffix to Thirumavalavan’s name) as I could
observe during a 2010 fieldwork. The axis of Dalit politics in the state appears to have
shifted (in public at  least)  away from conflict  with upper castes or Dravidian parties
towards political recognition and consolidation. In other fields, the VCK has moved to
recognise local commitment and the importance of women’s support in the elevation of
Pandiyammal36 to the city convenor in Madurai for instance. Given that the party has
always  drawn  on  a  large  reserve  army  of  women  activists  (Gorringe  2005)  such
recognition is both welcome and overdue. This step offers some hope that the resources
and security afforded by Thirumavalavan’s election as MP could be harnessed to carve
out  new  democratic  spaces  (Gundimeda  2009),  that  work  towards  the  ‘continuous
realization of  democracy as a concrete set of  practices,  instead of  valorising it  as an
abstract ideal’ (Pandian 2008: 7). The zeal with which the CPI(M) and the Tamil Nadu
Untouchability Eradication Front have taken up issues of caste discrimination suggest
that the political integration of the VCK has, perhaps, served to bring caste concerns to
the fore. The continued marginalisation of Dalit actors, however, was painfully illustrated
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in September 2011 when the mishandling of a rally in honour of Dalit hero Immanuel
Sekharan  led  to  confrontation  in  which  seven  Dalits  were  shot  dead  by  police  in
Paramakudi (Navayan 2011).
59 In sum, though, whilst Gamson (1990) and others view political engagement by social
movements as indicative of ‘success’, the example of the VCK testifies to the uncertain
benefits  and tangible  costs  of  political  engagement.  Gamson’s  typology of  movement
outcomes suggests that only those groups that fail to gain recognition are ‘pre-empted’ or
‘collapse’, the discussion above suggests that even full recognition of a movement can be
read as failure. This reminds us that citizenship is a process. As Mosse (2007: 28) argues
‘the  broader  point  is  that,  in  the  shift  from clientelism to  citizenship,  the  terms  of
citizenship are often given in advance in ways that may not  serve the needs of  the
poorest;  citizenship  has  its  exclusionary  dimension.’  Expanding  the  boundaries  of
citizenship will  require more than just  electoral  contestation.  Failing this,  ever more
people will concur with Lakshmanan’s analysis37 that: ‘The VCK are finished as a Dalit
movement; they are just another party now’.38
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NOTES
1. Thirumavalavan, interview by author, Chennai, November 1999. Thirumavalavan is the leader
of the Viduthalai Ciruthaigal Katchi (VCK)—the largest Dalit Party in Tamil Nadu. 
2. ‘Tada’ Periyasami, interview by author, Chennai, November 1999. At the time of the interview
‘Tada’ Periyasami was Assistant General Secretary of the VCK, though he left the Party in 2002 to
form his own group.
3. See Charsley (1996) on the naming of Untouchables. Scheduled Caste (SC) is the constitutional
epithet for ex-Untouchables entitled to positive discrimination (reservations). It does not, thus,
refer to ex-Untouchables who have converted to Christianity even though they are included in
the  Dalit  category.  Gandhi  used  Harijan,  meaning  ‘children  of  God’,  to  reject  the  perceived
impurity of Untouchables, but the name is seen as insulting because it evokes the offspring of
cross-caste marriages or Devadasis (temple prostitutes).
4. Muthukumar (pseudonym), interview by author, Edinburgh, August 2008. This paper draws on
fieldnotes and interview data from research on Tamil Dalit movements in 1998-99, and short
follow-ups in 2002 and 2010. Where appropriate, names have been anonymised.
5. T. Edwin (pseudonym), telephone interview by author, Madurai, September 2008.
6. I thank Sudipta Kaviraj for helping to clarify my argument here.
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7. On the non-Brahmin movement see Washbrook (1976), Pandian (1995), Subramanian (1999).
8. ‘Anna’ refers to Annadurai, the founding father of the DMK. The AIADMK claims to be closer to
his ideals.
9. P. Subramaniam (pseudonym), interview by author, Cuddalore, April 1999.
10. See  Subramanian  (2002:  129)  on  reservations  in  Tamil  Nadu.  Though  the  extension  of
reservations to Other Backwards Classes by the Dravidian parties initially benefited dominant
castes, they subsequently differentiated between Backward and Most Backward Castes and set
aside a quota for women. On the scale and success of the public distribution system in the state,
see Venkatsubramanian (2006).
11. I am grateful to one of SAMAJ referees for emphasizing this point.
12. The emergence of film-star Vijayakanth as a political contender in 2006 was significant for
his  attempt  to  challenge  the  Dravidian  parties  on  their  own  terms  and  reach  beyond  caste
constituencies by virtue of his image. On this, see Pandian (2006).
13. Muthukumar (pseudonym), interview by author, Edinburgh, August 2008.
14. R. Thirumavalavan, speech recorded and translated by author, Melakottai, 16 June 1999.
15. SCs comprise 18% of the Tamil population. Of the 72 recognised Scheduled Castes, there are
three main groups: Pallars, Paraiyar and Chakkiliyars. Although the most numerous category is
‘Adi-Dravidar’ and there are entries for Chakkiliyars, Arundhadiars, and Madaris, such categories
are  contested  and  political.  Adi-Dravidar  means  ‘original  Dravidian’  and  was  adopted  by
Untouchable groups in the late 19th and early 20 th centuries (primarily by Paraiyar castes) to
improve  their  status.  Chakkiliyar,  Arundhadiar  and Madari  are  used  interchangeably  on  the
ground,  as  are  Pallar  and  Devendra  Kula  Vellallar.  Accepting  common  usage,  there  are
approximately 4.6 million Paraiyars, 1.3 million Pallars, and 1.25 million Chakkiliyars (Sebastian
1994: Chapter 2).
16. Kannadasan (pseudonym), interview by author, Madurai,  July 1999. ‘MGR’ is a derogatory
remark likening Thirumavalavan to the AIADMK icon.
17. R. Thirumavalavan, speech recorded and translated by author, Chennai, 1 December 1999.
18. For similar work on other parties, see Bate (2009).
19. Karthik (pseudonym), interview by author, Madurai, January 2010.
20. Anandan Paraiyar, interview by author, Melavalavu, November 1999.
21. ‘Tada’ Periyasami, interview by author, Chennai, November 1999.
22. P. Subramaniam (pseudonym), interview by author, Cuddalore, April 1999.
23. R. Manohar, interview by author, Bangalore, January 2010.
24. Jahavar, interview by author, Madurai, January 2010.
25. R. Thirumavalavan, interview by author, Chennai, November 1999.
26. Paari Chezhian, interview by author, Allanganallur, January 2010.
27. Kamaraj, interview by author, Vadipatti, March 1999.
28. For similar analysis of the BSP’s political performance in Uttar Pradesh, see Jaoul (2007).
29. Paari Chezhian, interview by author, Allanganallur, January 2010.
30. R. Thirumavalavan, speech recorded and translated by author, Chennai, 1 December 1999.
31. R. Thirumavalavan, speech recorded and translated by author, Chennai, 1 December 1999.
32. R. Thirumavalavan, interview by author, Chennai, November 1999.
33. ‘Dalit’ Gnanasekharan, interview by author, Madurai, July 1999.
34. Who kindly provided me with his films on Parpapatti reserved-panchayat (council) and on
Iyothidoss Pandithar, the pioneering Dalit reformer.
35. Paari Chezhian, interview by author, Allanganallur, January 2010.
36. See Gorringe (2005: Chapter 6) for more on this inspiring, female grass-roots leader.
37. Lakshmanan, interview by author, Chennai, January 2010.
38. Many thanks to Ram Rawat and Tanya Carey at the Centre for the Advanced Study of India,
University of Pennsylvania where this article was first presented. I am grateful to Sudipta Kaviraj
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and Sam Gundimeda for comments on the conference paper. I am, though, thoroughly indebted
to the two anonymous reviewers for SAMAJ whose valuable comments have helped to sharpen
the aim and focus of the paper. The data here draws on ESRC funded doctoral work in 1998-9, and
a small project funded by The Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland in 2010.
ABSTRACTS
The Viduthalai  Ciruthaigal  Katchi  (VCK, Liberation Panther Party) has successfully transformed
from the largest Dalit movement in Tamil Nadu into a recognised political organisation. Social
movement theorists like Gamson (1990) view political recognition and engagement as one of the
main aims and successes of social mobilisation. Despite the obvious achievements of the VCK,
however,  activists  and  commentators  express  disappointment  or  disillusionment  with  its
performance.  The  Panthers  clearly  reject  the  caste  hierarchy,  but  they  increasingly  adopt
hegemonic forms of politics which can undermine their aims. This paper, thus, engages with the
questions of movement institutionalisation by tracing the political  trajectory of the VCK and
charting  its  resistance  to  and  compliance  with Dravidian  hegemony.  It  argues  that
institutionalisation needs to be understood within particular socio-political contexts and notes
how the hegemony of Dravidian politics partly explains the disjuncture between activist  and
political perceptions. It portrays how the dominant political parties have set the template for
what it means to ‘do’ politics in Tamil Nadu which serves as both an opportunity and a constraint
for potential challengers. 
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